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ABSTRACT 
Since most of the infrastructure projects are being built with public money, public 
procurement regulations apply. Compared to regular partnerships, it is hard to develop trust in 
procurement situations. Inspired by transaction costs economics, procurement processes are still 
considered as predominantly legal processes that are required before starting a project. 
Consequently the legal requirements usually prevail over the social process of deciding about the 
right partner to collaborate or the best propopal that would ensure project success. Nevertheless, 
the right partner and well-thought process design are critical for project success.  
We argue that procuring services and works for construction projects requires parallel 
processes of organisational sensemaking and bargaining. Therefore tender processes should be 
considered as an essential step in project management and designed accordingly. We aim at 
demonstrating why procurement processes should be considered as negotiation processes in 
which the procurement system facilitates the actors in making decisions instead of forcing them 
into a predefined (legal) system.  
The research is based on insights from two empirical case studies: one case about a 
Design Build contract for a Provicial Government House and once case about a Design, Build, 
Finance, Maintain contract for a large Tunnel. Empirical data from these cases indicate that 
sensemaking processes are necessary to induce mutual support for the contractual arrangement 
and a joint project execution. Difficulties in making sense of the project, the contract partner or 
the context result in execution problems that harm the success of the construction project. The 
findings of the cases are reflected upon literature from the field of organisation sciences about 
decision making and negotiating processes. In the conclusion we propose how sensemaking and 
negotiation can be included in the current procurement processes in construction.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Already in the sixties, Higgin and Jessop (1965) concluded that the construction industry 
suffered most from poor communication resulting in abortive work, misunderstanding and 
delays. This was reinforced by a study of Franks (1998) in which 25 per cent of all construction 
employers cited communication as a basic reason for failure. In the same year Thomas, Tucker 
and Kelly (1998) concluded that the ‘lack of effective communications’ was the major obstacle 
to project success, and Somogyi (1999) noted that inadequate information, late information and 
inadequate design brief were the three most common reasons for contract failures. In order to 
eliminate disputes and potential claims, Lavers (in Nicholson and Naamani 1992) therefore 
suggested that greater attention should be paid to improving communication. In the early 2000s, 
communication in construction gained interest amongst researchers. Accordingly Brown (2001) 
introduced the concepts of understanding and negotiations in relation to communication in 
design processes. He explained communication problems not just by focusing on problems of 
understanding between the construction parties, but also by showing how communication 
problems are useful ‘as a commercial negotiating tool’ for hidden agendas.  
The combination of increased project complexity (Baccarini 1996, Laufer, Denker and 
Shenhar 1996, Alderman et al. 2005, Walker 2007), changing government roles (Blanken 2008) 
and the construction sector’s poor professional functioning (Construction Task Force / Detr 
1998, National Audit Office 2001) has changed interactions involved in construction projects. 
Public principals remain more distant to construction projects, sourcing out more and more of the 
work. Contractors became involved in projects more early, and as a consequence, the contracts to 
govern construction projects had to be signed earlier in the process, when the chances to 
unforeseeable contingencies were great. Yet, communication and negotiation between different 
parties usually starts in the procurement phase. Renegotiations during the execution stage of 
projects therefore occurred on a regular basis (Dorée 2001) and perception differences often led 
to disputes (Reniers 2007). To come to a better understanding about project details, the allocation 
of responsibilities and risks and the terms for cooperation, both procuring authorities and 
contractors felt the need to have conversations before a contract was signed (Dorée 2001). 
In order to be able to trust each other it is critical for contractors to understand the client’s 
initial motivation to invest time and money in design, and for clients to understand the contractor 
(Cuff 1996). In other words, both parties need to make sense of each other to cross 
organizational borders (Pemsel and Widén 2011) because once they start collaborating formal 
and informal communication mechanisms will develop (De Blois et al. 2011). Hence it is argued 
that developing trust, a common language and an understanding of all parties’ requirements 
should be critical in the procurement phase, to ensure maximum disclosure and allow for the 
identification of areas of deficiency within the team as a whole (Brown 2001). Especially in case 
of integrated contracts parties are condemned to collaborate for an extensive period of time. It is 
thus imperative that partners are able to develop a shared aim of the project before this 
relationship is made official in a legal document.  
However, in current procurement practice tactical opportunities and opportunism for 
short-term financial planning are more commonplace than most dare to acknowledge (Hoezen 
2012). Many projects exhibit minimal input to defining their needs and translating these to 
functional requirements (Volker 2010). They rather haste to move on to latter stages of the 
building process based on a seemingly transparent image of the costs and time line of the project 
(Construction Task Force / Detr 1998). Moreover, the Construction Task Force concludes that a 
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lack of time is the most common reason to concerns of inadequacies in briefing and restricted 
communication. 
In this paper we argue that procuring services and works for construction projects 
requires parallel processes of organisational sensemaking and bargaining. Therefore tender 
processes should be considered as an essential step in project management and designed 
accordingly. We aim at demonstrating why procurement processes should be considered as 
negotiation processes in which the procurement system facilitates the actors in making decisions 
instead of forcing them into a predefined (legal) system.  
The research is based on insights from two empirical case studies: one case about a 
Design Build contract for a Provicial Government House and once case about a Design, Build, 
Finance, Maintain contract for a large Tunnel. Empirical data from these cases indicate that 
sensemaking processes are necessary to induce mutual support for the contractual arrangement 
and a joint project execution. The findings of the cases are reflected upon literature from the field 
of organisation sciences about decision making and negotiating processes. In the conclusion we 
propose how sensemaking and negotiation can be included in the current procurement processes 
in construction.  
FRAME OF REFERENCES 
Partnering in procurement situations 
Procurement refers to the function of purchasing goods or services from an outside body 
(Arrowsmith 2005). On 13 March 2004 two European tender directives were passed: the 
Directive 2004/17/EC coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors, and the Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination 
of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service 
contracts. The main objective of the procurement regulations is to ensure competition and 
accessibility for all market parties. In all tender processes, “contracting authorities shall treat 
economic operators equally and non-discriminatorily and shall act in a transparent way” 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2004: art 2). In practice, this is 
referred to as the legal principles of objectivity, transparency and non-discrimination. It is 
assumed that by applying the regulations authorities act carefully towards citizens and 
entrepreneurs and create best value for taxpayers’ money (Arrowsmith 2005).  
Implementing the procurement regulations every commissioning client in Europe is 
obliged to hold a tender for the selection of a partner that provides certain services and/or 
construct works above certain threshold amounts. Most of the infrastructure projects exceed this 
threshold. Procurement is often connected to the concept of transaction costs economics, which 
associates inter-firm exchanges with transactions costs caused by negotiation, administration, 
and contracting (Williamson 1998). A transaction is defined by Williamson (1998) as the transfer 
of a good or a service between separate units. Transactions have specific attributes that include 
asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency, and are associated with the assumption of bounded 
rationality (limited rationality due to cognitive constraints) and opportunism (self-interest). As 
transaction costs economics provides the basis for procurement, procurement processes in 
construction are still considered as predominantly legal processes that are required before 
starting a project. Consequently the legal requirements usually prevail over the social process of 
deciding about the right partner to collaborate in a project context.  
Nevertheless, the right partner and cooperative procurement procedures are critical for 
project success (Eriksson and Westerberg 2011). To select their project partner authorities can 
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generally choose between an ‘open procedure’ - procedures whereby any interested economic 
operator may submit a tender, and a ‘restricted procedure’ - procedures in which any economic 
operator may request to participate and whereby only those economic operators invited by the 
contracting authority may submit a tender (European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union 2004). In specific cases the client can select a procedure with an increased level of 
interaction between the buyer and the supplier. In the ‘negotiated procedure’ the contracting 
authorities consult the economic operators of their choice and negotiate the terms of contract 
with one or more of these. A ‘competitive dialogue’ is procedure in which any economic 
operator may request to participate and whereby the contracting authority conducts a dialogue 
with the candidates admitted to that procedure, with the aim of developing one or more suitable 
alternatives capable of meeting its requirements, and on the basis of which the candidates chosen 
are invited to tender. 
These procedures are not specially developed for infrastructure projects. Yet, most of the 
research on tender and procurement is done in the context of construction projects. This is, 
amongst others, caused by the fact that trust, control, risk and performance are important 
variables in building inter-organizational relationships (Zaheer, Mcevily and Perrone 1998, Klein 
Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom 2005, Kadefors and Laan 2010), issues that are hard to 
address in traditional procurement situations. Whereas in regulation business situations, the 
buyer is allowed to build on his or her relational network and previous expriences, a public 
commissioning client has to apply the principles of objectivity, transparancy and non-
discrimination to select a projectpartner. This results in a situation in which no one-to-one 
situation is allowed.  
In these kinds of situations contracting authorities do not invest much in growing trust, 
since they have to await which one of the contenders will gain the contract. Contractors, on the 
other hand, remain distant from the contracting authority as long as they are in competition with 
others. They keep information to themselves, which also makes it difficult to develop trust. In 
this context Hoezen and Dorée (2008) clearly address the psychological aspects of the 
competitive dialogue procedure. They conclude that in case of dynamic dialogues (which are 
actually exclusively used in complex cases where written questions and answers would be 
insufficient), both contracting authorities and candidates feel insecure whether acting conform 
the legal principles of objectivity, transparency and non-discrimination. To conclude, this means 
that compared to regular partnerships, it is harder to develop trust and build a relationship in 
procurement situations.  
Negotiation as a concept of bargaining and sensemaking  
According to Ring and Van De Ven (1994) organizations focus on formal bargaining and 
informal sensemaking during negotiations in inter-organizational relationships. By negotiating 
parties develop joint expectations about their motivations, possible investments and perceived 
uncertainties. To a certain extent they also get to know and understand each other . By 
information confinement, by turning tacit knowledge into words and schemas, by sharing 
knowledge, assumptions and mental models, and by reduced impact of biases, parties grow and 
create meaning of the transaction, the context of the transaction, and the value of it to the other 
party and to oneself. Within the field of transaction costs economics, procurement is viewed as a 
bargaining process, aimed at coming to an agreement in a situation where the parties involved 
have somewhat conflicting interests. The terms of the agreement are the subject of the 
bargaining. In their attempt to come to a consensus about these terms, several mechanisms occur, 
such as focusing attention, forcing articulation, deliberation and reflection, interacting, and 
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reducing biases, judgment errors, incompleteness and inconsistency (Vlaar, Van Den Bosch and 
Volberda 2006).  
In current practice the written questions and answers and the presentation of a vision (or 
sketch design) are the most common communication tools during procurement processes of 
building projects (Volker 2010). Sometimes information meetings are organized by clients but 
visits to reference projects of tender candidates hardly ever take place. For the procurement of 
infrastructural works the most popular tender communication practices are written questions and 
answers and the assessment of a construction plan for the project. This indicates that the current 
procurement practice holds a very strict view on possibilities for the parties to interact. These 
practices with static interaction provide much confidence to the procuring agency, since clients 
know how to handle the legal principles of objectivity, transparency and non-discrimination. Yet, 
an independent supervisor of the communication process could support correct implementation 
of procurement law in situations of personal interaction (Chao-Duivis 2008) while also meeting 
the EU ground principles.  
Vlaar, Van Den Bosch and Volberda (2006) state that the identified bargaining processes 
help in making sense of the inter-organizational relationship and to its context. Sensemaking is a 
social process during which members of an organization interpret their environment in and 
through interactions with others, thus constructing observations that allow them to comprehend 
the world and to act collectively (e.g. Starbuck and Milliken 1988, Isabella 1990, Weick 1993, 
Weick 1995, Maitlis 2005). Parties with different beliefs and assumptions have to create 
coherent understandings in order to come to collective action. 
Whereas in transaction costs economics the emphasis is placed on the differences in 
interests between the parties, social psychologists tend to emphasize the risk that problems linked 
to understanding could arise because the two parties involved have different backgrounds, work 
in different cultures and have dissimilar belief systems (Sutcliffe and Huber 1998). Yet, since the 
two parties intend to work together, they will strive for congruent views on the purpose and 
expectations of the relationship. Sensemaking processes are therefore assumed to play a central 
role in the procurement of a project. The result of these sensemaking processes is an 
understanding of the transaction, the context of the transaction and the value of it to the other 
party and to oneself. Shared understandings between the two parties are reflected in mutual 
beliefs, norms, values and routines. These form the basis for commitment. 
Formal and informal contracts as a sign of commitment 
Next to contractual governance strategies also relational governance strategies have been 
studied (Vandaele et al. 2007, Poppo, Zheng Zhou and Zenger 2008). Governance refers to the 
formal and informal rules of exchange between partners (e.g. Nooteboom 1996, Vandaele et al. 
2007). Contractual governance can be defined as an established formal, legal, and economic 
governance strategy; relational governance refers to the developing strength of the social norms 
present in the exchange and has often been referred to as relationalism. Relational governance 
usually employs a positive link with contractual governance. Commitment refers to the state of 
being bound to a course of action or to another party, and stems from both natural motivators as 
feelings of empathy or shared values, and from artificial motivators as contract clauses and 
reward mechanisms. Commitment to the project by both public principal and his contractor is 
reflected in agreements and the signing of a contract (Kamminga 2008). 
Also in governance research in the domain of organization and management studies, 
transaction costs economics was the leading perspective for long. In transaction costs economics 
three governance forms were identified, congruent with the ordering principles of Williamson 
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(1975). Combining the three-way distinctions made in ordering principles and governance forms 
by Williamson (1975) and Nooteboom (1996), social psychologists have, however, developed a 
two-way distinction. They distinct between formal control based on measures, and informal 
control based on values (Eisenhardt 1985, Kadefors and Laan 2010, Hoezen 2012). Thus, 
commitment became reflected in two types of contracts: formal legal contracts and informal 
psychological contracts. This is depicted in Table 1 and explained in the next section. 
The informal psychological contract is related to the term informal control, as used by 
relational governance academics. Following Kadefors and Laan (2010) “informal control is 
about purposefully establishing norms, values and routines, to reduce discrepancies in goal 
preferences and inclinations towards opportunism. Consequentially, informal control reduces 
risk through the establishment of shared values. A shared understanding encourages parties to 
establish reasonable and achievable goals, which as well reduces risk” (Das and Teng 2001). 
Thus, the informal psychological contract is referred to as the implicit set of expectations 
between procuring agency and its contractor, which are subject to continual change. As such, it is 
a highly flexible and undefined set of terms which are interpreted by the individuals involved. 
Although it is only implicit, it can be a significant determinant of behavior within transactions, 
and any perceived violations can have lasting effects.  
Ring and Van De Ven (1994) describe how the informal contract becomes formally 
codified. Given that individuals act as agents for their organizations, these organizations will 
require formal documentation and standardization. Thus, the informal commitments made by 
interacting individuals will be put into writing for their organizations and for other individuals 
also acting as agents for these organizations. Furthermore, informal commitments become 
institutionalized over time due to the repetitive execution of acts by the individuals involved. 
Berger and Luckmann (1966: 57) describe this as follows: “Man is capable of producing a world 
that he then experiences as something other than a human product”.  
The formal legal contract, a reflection of formal control, contains both limitations on the 
opportunities for opportunism and limitations on the material incentives to utilize these 
opportunities. There are several mechanisms with which contracting parties could address this 
form of control (Nooteboom 1996). These mechanisms, that are derived from transaction cost 
economics, are: a shift in rights/powers of decision (when the procuring agency delegates (part 
of) its rights or decision-making power to the contractor); reward systems (either output- or 
input-based payment); monitoring (a mechanism to check the contractor’s actual efforts); and 
bonding (a mechanism for the contractor to prove its efforts to the principal) (Douma and 
Schreuder 2008, Kamminga 2008). 
Vlaar, Van Den Bosch and Volberda (2006) argue that there are several disadvantages in 
formalizing informal understandings. They come to the conclusion that formalization may have 
negative effects on sensemaking, causing new problems in understanding. The risk is that it may 
make events appear more comprehensible and controllable than they really are. It may lead to 
formalism, resulting in increased rigidity, a loss of creativity and flexibility, and diminished 
trust. Further, the preparation of formal legal contracts may involve large efforts and huge 
transaction costs, and it could hamper the conversation when the benefits of the contract are 
unclear to the parties. Furthermore, although standardized formal contracts guide the agents of 
organizations, Ring and Van De Ven (1994: 106) argue that “new agents may employ these 
blueprints without fully understanding the initial and changing intentions of a relationship. As 
this drift between appreciation of the formal and informal contracts develops over time, we 
would expect conflicts to erupt among the parties.” This suggests that these conflicts (problems 
Proceedings – EPOC 2012 Conference 
8 
 
of understanding) can either terminate the relationship or initiate another cycle of negotiations 
(bargaining / sensemaking). 
 
Table 1. From three governance forms to two contract types 
Ordering principles of  
Williamson (1975) and 
Nooteboom (1996) 
Governance forms of 
Nooteboom (1996) 
Types of control of 
Eisenhardt (1985) and 
Kadefors and Laan 
(2010) 
Contract types of Hoezen 
(2012) 
Social ordering   
Decreasing propensity for 
opportunism by using 
norms, values and loyalty  
 
Benevolence 
Limitation on inclination 
towards opportunism 
based on established, 
socially inculcated norms 
and values; and also on 
empathy, identification, 
affect and routines 
developed in specific 
relationships  
Informal control 
Purposefully establishing 
norms, values and routines 
to reduce discrepancies in 
goal preferences and 
inclinations towards 
opportunism 
Informal psychological 
agreement 
Norms, values and 
routines 
Private ordering 
Incentives such as shared 
ownership of specific 
investment, and reputation 
mechanisms or posting of 
hostages 
Incentive control 
Limitation on material 
incentives to utilize 
opportunities for 
opportunism 
Formal control 
Establishing and utilizing 
contracts, formal 
procedures and monitoring 
policies  
 
Formal legal contract  
Contract, formal 
procedures and monitoring 
policies Legal ordering 
Means to constrain 
opportunism including 
contracts and monitoring 
Opportunity control 
Limitation on the 
opportunities for 
opportunism 
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate why procurement processes should be considered 
as negotiation processes in which the procurement system facilitates the actors in making 
decisions instead of forcing them into a predefined (legal) system. By showing what impact 
perceptions of the legal system have on the development of procurement processes, we 
demonstrate that its restrictive and/or facilitating character is crucial to the development of 
procurement processes and establishing commmittments. Main research question is: “What’s the 
effect of the perceptions of the legal procurement system on negotiation processes that determine 
the commitment of public and private parties in infrastructure?” 
The analytical frame guiding the collection of data was derived from the frame of 
references as described in the previous section. It consists of three consecutive and iterative 
stages of procuring a contract: initialization, negotiation, and commitment. The initialization is 
determined by the perception of the two logics that exist in infrastructure projects: the 
procurement logics and the partnering logics. From a procurement perspective the client and 
contractors bargain about the terms of agreement in the negotiation phase, while this kind of 
interaction causes the actors to make sense of their own internal environment and thus the future 
performances. The commitment stage focuses on the natural and artificial motivators leading to a 
certain action. These commitments are secured by formal legal contracts and informal 
psychological agreements. So across the whole process of awarding the contract, the 
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initialisation is determining the negotiation process and thus influences the commitment between 
the parties involved.  
 
 
Figure 1: Analytical framework 
 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
The research question about the effect of perceptions of the legal system on negotiation 
and commitment is an explanatory one. The nature of this type of question is that they deal with 
“operational links, needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence” 
(Yin 2009: 9). Unlike exploratory “what” questions, that could be answered using almost any 
type of research, answering explanatory “how/why”-questions are likely to require the use of 
case studies, experiments or histories (Edmondson and Mcmanus 2007). The choice for one from 
these three, or perhaps a combination thereof, will be determined by the events that are being 
researched. Yin (2009) shows that this choice is determined both by the extent of control over 
and by the access to the events. When the researcher has neither control over nor access to the 
events under study, formulating a history is the preferred approach.  
A case study is preferred when examining contemporary events, in a situation where the 
researcher is unable to manipulate relevant behaviors. When the relevant behaviors can be 
manipulated directly, precisely and systematically, experiments are likely to be a better option. 
Considering access and control aspects of the current research question, our problem satisfies the 
conditions set by Yin (2009) for case study research. The procurement process is a contemporary 
event, but one that cannot be influenced by the researcher. Case study research would therefore 
seem to be the best method to answer the research question. 
Yin (2009: 18) defines case study research as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. In addition to this 
definition of the subject of case study research, Yin (2009: 18) also provides an indication of the 
appropriate data collection method: “the case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive 
situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and [...] relies 
on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and 
[...] benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and 
analysis”. 
Initialization 
 
Procurement logics 
Partnering logics 
Commitment 
 
Formal legal contract 
Informal psychological 
agreement 
Negotiations 
 
External bargaining 
Internal sensemaking 
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For this study, data were collected through a combination of interviews, desk research 
and observations (see Table 2). Case studies were used as a rich empirical description of 
particular social entities that are typically based on a variety of data sources (Easton 2010). The 
variety of different forms of data allowed for triangulation between self-report, observed 
behavior and official justifications of the case data. The data were initially analyzed as separate 
case identities and then systematically compared on appearing constructs collaboratively. The 
concepts in the analytical framework are treated as sensitizing concepts. According to Blumer 
(1969: 148), a sensitizing concept “gives the user a general sense of reference and guidance in 
approaching empirical instances. Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to 
see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look. The hundreds of our 
concepts – like culture, institutions, social structure, mores, and personality – are not definitive 
concepts but are sensitizing in nature”.  
Throughout data analysis and reporting the authors were frequently going back and forth 
between the interpretation and the original data. This process can be characterized as ex ante use 
of theory in qualitative research (Andersen and Kragh 2010). The general aim of this approach is 
“not to build consensus aiming diverging theoretical perspectives but rather to use their 
divergences as vantage points for creating new insights” (Andersen and Kragh 2010: 53).  
 
Table 2: Data collection methods for the two cases 
Data collection 
method 
Provincial Government House  Road Infrastructure Tunnel  
Desk research 15 documents (working documents, 
competition rules) 
13 documents (2 evaluation reports, 4 
procurement protocols, 6 versions of the contract 
and 1 document containing the 2780 dialogue 
questions and answers) 
Interviews Informal conversations with project 
team and client body members during 
a 7 month period noted in a research 
log of 30 pages. 
29 interviews, generating 357 pages of 
transcribed interviews  
(Participative) 
observations 
Period before official announcement 
until the process was cancelled right 
after selection phase (July 2007 - 
January 2008) - 20 meetings (general 
reports) 
During the first year of the construction stage 
(September 2008 until July 2009) 
   
CASE DESCRIPTIONS: 
Case A: DB contract for a Provincial Government Office 
This case concerns the selection of a Design and Build consortium for a new part of the 
governmental offices of the Province of Utrecht. The current offices of the Province consist of a 
tower, built in the 90s, and a lower block called ‘The Stars’, built in the 70s. The case concerns 
the tendering procedure for a new building replacing ‘The Stars’. The brief for the Provincial 
Government House read as follows (translated from Dutch by the author):“The new building has 
to form a new office concept with flexible workplaces and contemporary facilities …. The 
building has to offer about 10,200 m2 usable floor area (about 16,000m2 gross floor area) and 
space for about 500 workplaces.“ 
The Provincial agency chose to tender their contract as a Design and Build contract and 
to use a restricted tendering procedure. To apply for the tender interested parties were asked to 
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form a consortium, which should include at least an architect, a contractor and a project manager. 
The consortium would be responsible for delivering the new building (design as well as 
construction) for a fixed price of € 39 million excluding VAT. All consortia participating in the 
award phase would receive financial compensation of € 150.000. 
Eight consortia applied for this tender. The exclusion and selection criteria were based on 
strict organizational and financial requirements of the consortium but the deciding factor was 
suitability of the architect, to be assessed based on three reference projects that were designed by 
the proposed leading architect. Three consortia were excluded for failing to meet the minimum 
requirements, resulting in five candidates.  
The selection committee, consisting of members of the executive board of the Province 
and an independent chair, determined the degree in which the reference projects fulfilled the 
criteria of a ‘public, timeless, business-like character with a human scale’ in a single meeting of 
three hours. They were assisted by an architectural expert. This resulted in a decision to allow all 
five parties into the award phase. Unfortunately the tender was cancelled immediately after the 
selection phase due to reconsideration of the decision to replace the lower part of the building.  
Case B: DBFM contract for reconstruction and expansion of an existing tunnel 
The Second Coen Tunnel project is large (estimated net present value 300 million) and 
complex, and involves the maintenance of an existing, 40-year old tunnel plus the construction of 
a second tunnel alongside the current one. The project was procured by the Dutch Highway 
Agency called Rijkswaterstaat in a competitive dialogue procedure. Five consortia met the 
qualification criteria and were therefore invited to participate in the dialogue. Based on the 
evaluation of the intended actions for carrying out the project, three candidates were invited to 
the next consultation stage. These parties all went into a dialogue process about risks and 
optional requirements. The contract was awarded to the consortium having best met the agency’s 
requirements, both quantitatively and financially, based on the economically most advantageous 
offer.  
The contract for the Coen Tunnel project was signed in 2008, and the maintenance of the 
existing tunnel was then transferred to the contractor. The construction stage for the new tunnel 
started in 2009. This service-led infrastructure project, the first to be procured using the CD 
procedure in the Netherlands, consists of widening approximately 14 kilometers of highways at 
the north and south entrances to the existing Coen Tunnel, and expanding the tunnel’s capacity 
from two lanes to three in each direction plus two further reversible lanes, enabling five lanes of 
traffic in one direction during peak hours. 
The duration of the contract has been set at 30 years, from 2008 to 2036, and consists of 
the construction and maintenance of new infrastructure (construction due for completion in 
2013) and the renovation and maintenance of existing infrastructure (roads and original tunnel). 
The service component in this project consists of making available eight traffic lanes passing 
under the Noordzee Canal which connects Amsterdam to the North Sea. 
RESULTS 
Initialization 
Procurement logics 
The two cases were procured with use of two different procurement procedures. Case A 
made use of the restricted procedure, whilst case B used the competitive dialogue procedure. In 
Case A the agency started the project about 2 years before the tender notification. Most of the 
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time was spent on identifying the actual technical and functional needs while they mainly 
ignored to specify the contextual boundaries. In a later stage of the project the political 
implication of such a commitment appeared to be one of the main motives to cancel the project. 
In Case B the preparations for the project started approximately 15 years before the tender was 
announced. For a long time the agency headed for a Design and Construct contract. Due to a lack 
of finances, it decided to transform the contract into a DBFM agreement. The specifications, 
until then primarily output based, were then rewritten into functional specifications. In both cases 
the tender specifications were not fully crystallized. This left room for substantial interpretation 
differences between the commissioning agency and the tender candidates but also within the 
project team members of the commissioning agency.  
In Case A the minimum requirements and selection were based on strict organizational 
and financial requirements of the consortium but the deciding factor was suitability of the 
architect, to be assessed by three reference projects designed by the proposed leading architect. 
In this sense they successfully searched for an interpretation of the contemporary procurement 
practice that fitted their aims. However, since the tender was cancelled after the selection phase, 
we will never know the actual effect of the tender design on the negotiation and commitment 
processes. The criteria in Case B focused on risk allocation, optional requirements and bid price. 
Although these criteria met the legal requirements of transparency, objectivity and non-
discrimination as such, in both cases the perception of the criteria differed significantly between 
the tender candidates and the commissioning agency.  
Partnering logics 
The procuring agency in case B was much more experienced in procuring and 
constructing infrastructure projects than the procuring agency in case A. However, the 
experience of the agency in case B did not include DBFM contracts nor the competitive dialogue 
procedure. This meant that both agencies had to make sense of the procurement process itself 
and of the specific implications of the process for the organization of their project. 
For case A, the agency was looking for a contractor who could design and build their new 
governmental office building, of which the specifications were drafted at a conceptual level. 
Although the agency decided to offer a Design and Build contract, the observations indicated 
that the board members were not aware of the integrated - and therefore not traditional -
construction process. So their perception of partnering was not linked to the legal format of the 
potential commitment.  
For case B, the agency sought for a service-provider who could not just design and build, 
but also reconstruct and maintain their tunnel for a period of 30 years. The interaction with the 
different contractors during the procurement phase triggered the agency to rethink their 
assumptions that provided the basis for the contract and the actual roles and responsibilities of 
both parties. During the dialogue in the procurement phase risks and optional requirements were 
discussed at length. This created the basis for the partnering agreement.   
Negotiation 
External bargaining 
In Case B the rules for negotiation were unclear due to a lack of experience with the 
specific tender procedure with the agency as well as the candidates. The legal principle of non-
discrimination implicated that the procuring agency provided all candidates with the same tender 
information. Information given to one of the candidates during a dialogue conversation, should 
therefore be given to the other candidates as well. Reproducing information, exchanged during a 
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conversation, is difficult. It made the procuring agency reluctant to give any information at all. 
As one of the agency’s employees said: “I’d give as little information as possible: when I’d say 
nothing, it would not be possible to say something wrong either”. Before each dialogue 
conversation, candidates had therefore to hand in their questions in writing. During the dialogue, 
only these questions (and no complementary ones) were discussed. After the dialogue, answers 
to the questions were sent to all the candidates, except for the few questions that concerned 
intellectual property. Thus, the procuring agency made sure to act conform the non-
discrimination principle. Candidates on the other hand, were not too convinced that the procuring 
agency would handle their design solutions confidentially. The legal principle of transparency 
did not comfort them at all: “We would not give too much information with concern to our 
design solution: who would know if another candidate would gain the contract using our brilliant 
ideas?”. As a result, the bargaining process did not include too much exchange of information: 
during the dialogue conversations the agency just answered the questions that were handed in at 
forehand, and candidates did not want to share too much either.  
In Case A most of the uncertainties relates to the domain specific knowledge of the 
agency. The decision makers were uncertain about the response of the market parties on their 
announcement. The market was very tight at the moment and the project budget was limited. In 
the end eight candidates replied to the call, of which three did not meet the minimum 
requirements. The agency applied the selection criteria on these five candidates and concluded 
that they all had met the official selection criteria. The fear for insufficient competition turned 
out to be unjust. The selection was based on the mood boards that the candidates submitted to 
show their frame of references. This can be considered as a passive bargaining process by the 
means of architectural design. Since the selection committee consisted of members without any 
domain specific knowledge, they had invited an expert to inform them about the background of 
the firms. This kind of knowledge increased their information position, enabling them to 
internally reconsider inviting the consortia for the next phase of procurement. The actual 
bargaining process was about to begin when the tender was cancelled.  
Internal sensemaking 
In Case A the use of the procurement process uncovered the fear of negotiating a 
commitment. There were two aspects that caused a lack of support for the continuation of the 
project. Firstly, internally one was still not convinced that reconstruction on the proposed 
location was the best solution for their accommodation problem. The democratic character of the 
Dutch Provinces requires elections every four years. The decision to rebuild a part of the 
building was taken in a previous period of administration. This meant that the current director 
had to execute a decision of his predecessor which did not made sense to him. This also caused 
the second aspect to come to play: the fear of committing to an integrated Design and Build 
contract. Such a contract would mean losing control over the actual building: aspects that were 
not included in the specifications would never be realized. These internal process of sensemaking 
within the agency preceded the common process of sensemaking between the agency and the 
market party during the negotiation phase.  
In Case B another dimension of sensemaking was touched upon. Due to the fact that 
neither one of the parties was willing to give too much information to the other, both of them had 
to go to internal sensemaking processes. They interpreted the acts and sayings of the other 
without checking if their interpretations matched reality. An example of a situation in which 
internal sensemaking took place, is when the Alignment Decision (formal legal court decision 
about the agency’s infrastructure plans) for the Second Coen tunnel was rejected. At that time, 
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two of three bids were already rejected, yet no preferred bidder had been appointed yet. The 
agency decided to await a positive Alignment Decision before it would appoint the preferred 
bidder. With a preferred bidder, the Agency faced the risk that it would have to pay the bidder 
anyways even when the project would not take place. Not appointing the preferred bidder was a 
cheap exit option in case the Alignment Decision would stay out. A bargaining process started, 
during which the remaining bidder tried to convince the agency to appoint the preferred bidder 
anyways. Instead of explaining its action, the agency keeps repeating that it will not appoint a 
preferred bidder. Then an internal sensemaking process starts, resulting in the conclusion of the 
remaining bidder that the agency wants to get rid of him. Meanwhile it did not know about the 
agency’s difficulties even to get the Decision to start the project.  
Commitment 
Formal legal contract 
In Case A the formal control was held by cancelling the tender procedure. Fortunately for 
the agency this did not lead to financial claims of the candidates but did cause a lot of 
unnecessary internal and external transaction costs. These could have been prevented if more 
sensemaking would have happened within the organization of the Provincial agency. The 
commissioning agency is thus fully to blame for the  lack of a formal contract.  
In Case B, the agency got an Alignment Decision shortly after the bargaining process. 
When the agency is willing to appoint the preferred bidder, this bidder claimed financial losses. 
A new bargaining started during which the contractual terms remained the same. Yet the price 
was raised a bit and the delivery date for the project postponed. The contract contained a 
management plan and a monitoring system, combined with a negotiated allocation of risks 
between agency and contractor. The reward was raised since rates on loans increased, due to the 
collapse of the monetary system during the Alignment Decision delay. 
Informal psychological agreement 
The agency in Case A obviously had a different perception of the binding character of a 
legal procedure as intended by the European procurement law. It appeared as if they used the 
tender to consult the market about the prospective of their construction project. During the tender 
the agency realized that they had lost control over the project and hesitated about the initial 
starting position. The positive market reply, however, made them realize that starting a tender 
procedure could actually result in a legal obligation of several million Euros. Their formal action 
to cancel the project was a result of an informal loss of control caused by increased sensemaking.  
In Case B, the agency felt that the contractor had claimed much more money and delay 
time than was realistic. This resulted in decreased benevolence from the agency’s side. During 
execution of the contract, bad performances of the contracted became immediate reason for 
penalty’s. This illustrates that although the formal legal contract appeared to be just, the informal 
psychological agreement has led to frictions in the collaboration between both parties. Further 
joint sensemaking processes could have prevented this to a large extend.  
CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION 
The selection of collaboration partners can be considered as an essential element of 
realising construction projects. Currently the economic and legal frame overshadows the social 
aspects of these kinds of partnering decisions. In Case A we saw that the prospects of taking on a 
substantial financial commitment made the agency decide to cancel the tender procedure. In this 
case the interaction and negotiation process with the market parties remained restricted to 
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announcing the call and judging the potential award candidates based on their portfolio. This 
selection process, however, accelerated the sensemaking process of the client, which eventually 
led to a reconsideration of the actual accommodation needs.  
In Case B the competitive dialogue showed the opportunities and pitfalls of the project to 
both the client and the candidates. The procurement context hampered parties to share 
information. The fact that a dialogue is wished for, whilst the procedure is new, made parties 
insecure about what one can and cannot say. This makes that a real conversation stayed out. 
Candidates feared that their information would benefit other candidates, and the agency feared to 
disadvantage others when sharing information with particular candidates. The principles of 
objectivity, transparency and non-discrimination thus restrained the interaction rather than 
helping it: parties kept their information to themselves. 
Based on two cases we conclude that room for sensemaking, negotiations and bargaining 
is required for the selection of the right collaborative partners in construction projects, even if the 
legal frame is tight. The complex and unique character of the assignment requires a thorough 
analysis of the problem; internally within the organisation and together with the potential 
partners. The legal frame of procurement regulations can provide the conditions in which these 
kinds of transactions are taking place, but should not determine the course of events. By making 
sense during the selection process the contractual agreements that follow from intensive 
negotiation processes increase the mutual understanding about the expectations from both sides 
at the table.  
Case A showed that when an agency has not made enough sense of their actual needs, 
sensemaking processes do not develop parallel between the partners. This causes a lot of 
transaction costs, frustration and social unacceptance. The agency in case B decided to use the 
tender to increase communication and negotations measures with the potential construction 
partners. Their decision showed that they were willing to invest in relational governance in a 
relatively early phase of the construction process. The fact that they were innovative and daring 
in their approach definitely contributed to the successful start of such a complex public private 
project.  
During analysis of the cases we realised that negotiating performance based 
specifications replaces part of the traditional briefing processes since the sensemaking processes 
continue during partner selection. A complicating factor is that during procurement the legal 
requirements of transparancy, objectivity and non discrimination change the conditions of 
interactions. Yet, this can also be considered as an opportunity since it creates a parallel 
sensemaking process between supply and demand. This increases the chance of mutial 
understanding of the contract and decreased the information assymetry between the parties.  
The use of multiple data sets made it possible to compare different perspectives on the 
process of partner selection. As shown in the data these perspectives differ per contracting 
agency and tender candidate. Especially the combination of semi structured interviews, informal 
documents and (informal) observations increased insights about possible conflictive elements. 
Our research findings are based on two case studies in a different infrastructural and 
procurement context. Despite the limitation of this kind of case selection, we are convinced of 
the value of our findings. Further research could explore the differences and similarities more 
systematically. It would also be interesting to find professional agencies who are willing to 
experiment with a variety of interaction patterns during tenders. This would enable validation of 
assumptions about specific requirements of negotiation and bargaining processes, within and 
without the procurement conditions.  
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